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Effects of economic variables on NPLs depending on the economic cycle 
Abstract 
Late payments are a major problem for Spanish banks. This paper studies as determinants 
of loan delinquency: unemployment, interest rates, inflation, housing prices, leverage, 
bad debt coverage and solvency, which were the main problems facing the Spanish 
economy between 2004 and 2015, and also examines these determinants in periods of 
growth and recession. The results show that the price of housing, bad debt coverage, 
interest rates and solvency are the variables with the greatest impact on NPLs. 
Furthermore, differences exist in the behaviour of variables during periods of growth 
compared with periods of recession. Inertia of the dependent variable has also been 
detected. 
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In the period 2004-2008, the Spanish financial system grew at a very fast rate and enjoyed 
high profits. However, in 2009 the cycle changed and in six years, according to the Bank 
of Spain, impairment losses amounted to 265.5 billion euros, which is more than 25% of 
Spanish GDP. This situation forced the Spanish authorities to request financial aid from 
the European Commission worth up to 100 billion euros in 2012 (European Commission, 
2012). 
State aid requested by Spanish banks exceeds 60 billion euros (Climent 2013), 25 billion 
of which, in 2013 the FROB already considered irrecoverable (FROB 2013). Traditional 
savings banks have disappeared because they have been absorbed, nationalized or merged 
and all have been converted into commercial banks (Climent and Pavia 2014, 2015b). 
Therefore, many towns with small populations have been left without financial services. 
In terms of RRHH, between 2010 and 2015, 13,083 branches closed, 29.57% of the total 
that existed in 2009 (BdEc 2017). In the last six years, 75,347 jobs have been destroyed, 
amounting to 27.07% (BdEc 2017), further aggravating the problem of unemployment in 
the Spanish economy. 
One of the main causes of the events described in the preceding paragraphs is the high 
level of non-performing loans (NPLs) of Spanish credit institutions. NPLs in this period 
were the highest recorded by the Bank of Spain, with a maximum of 13.53% in January 
2014. However, these same banks, in the period 2004 to 2007, enjoyed the lowest 
recorded delinquency rates, less than 1%. This big difference and the events discussed 
above are sufficiently important reasons for studying the relatively short periods from 
2004 to 2009 and from 2010 to 2015. 
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The factors that determine bad debts are used to predict future events, especially given 
the widespread use of stress tests in the banking sector. Therefore, it is important to know 
how these determinants affect NPLs in each of the two sub-periods, because if there are 
differences between the results obtained during periods of growth compared with 
recessions, these differences should be applied to the estimates. 
In light of the foregoing, this work has two objectives. Firstly, we will investigate how 
the main problems suffered by the Spanish economy and the credit institutions have 
affected loan delinquency rates. To do this, we will study the impact that unemployment 
levels, interest rates, inflation, the price of housing, leverage, bad debt coverage and 
solvency have had on loan delinquency in the Spanish credit institutions. Secondly, we 
will determine if the effect of these factors in periods of economic growth is different 
compared to recession periods. 
New contributions to the literature are made in relation to these two objectives. First, the 
effects of the main problems suffered by the Spanish economy, and the consequences for 
NPLs, are considered. Furthermore, two stages (growth and recession) are studied 
independently, investigating whether a structural break took place. The effect and 
strength of each of these factors in each of the periods as a determinant of loan 
delinquency are studied. In addition, a new explanatory variable is included—NPL 
coverage—that is to say, the ratio calculated as the provision for credit losses divided by 
the total outstanding loan balance. 
Through these two new contributions, techniques will be obtained that serve to predict 
payment delinquency, in both growth and crisis periods. To do this, we construct an 
econometric model with a sample period from 2004 to 2015 and two more models with 
sub-samples from 2004 to 2009 and 2010 to 2015. 
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Their use will improve the techniques used in the stress test based on different types of 
scenarios, because for each type of scenario the impact of economic factors (explanatory 
variables) will be different, not only because of the change in the value of the variable, 
but also due to the force that acts on the dependent variable, in this case the non-
performing loans. 
The main results obtained in the investigation indicate that the behaviour of the 
determinants is different in times of economic growth compared with recession periods. 
Therefore, an increase in the unemployment rate of the same amount does not have the 
same effect on NPLs when the economy is growing as it does when it is in recession. The 
same goes for the price of housing, the own funds of credit institutions, leverage, interest 
rates, inflation, NPL coverage and the inertia of loan delinquency. 
1.1. Justification for the choice of Spain and overview of loan delinquency in Europe 
In the early years of the 21st century, NPLs in most credit institutions around the world 
remained stable. However, the global financial crisis of 2007 to 2008 affected the quality 
of loans, but in different ways in each geographical area or country. In the case of Spain, 
according to Ontiveros and Berges (2010), the impact was delayed by more than a year 
compared with other countries. 
The same factors can affect each country differently. For example, Beck, Jakubik and 
Piloiu (2013) argue that factors such as the depreciation of the exchange rate produces an 
increase in NPLs in countries with a high number of foreign currency loans. For example, 
the depreciation of local currencies in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe against 
the Swiss franc and, to a lesser extent, the Euro, negatively affected the quality of assets 
in Poland, Hungary and Croatia. The researchers also claim that a decrease in share prices 
will more negatively affect the quality of bank assets in countries with large stock 
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markets. Finally, they indicate that the effect of the same variable—GDP—on loan 
delinquency is different in various European countries. For example, the effect of GDP 
on NPLs in the Baltic countries like Latvia is much greater compared to countries such 
as Germany. 
Legislation on mortgage loans also affects different countries differently. For example, a 
fall in the value of collateral for housing loans will affect loan delinquency differently in 
countries where mortgage loans legally allow dation in payment (property given in 
payment of a debt to discharge the debt in full), compared to countries such as Spain 
where mortgage guarantees extend to all property and personal rights of the holders of 
the mortgage. 
Another factor is how monetary policy is implemented. In the case of Spain, the 
expansionary monetary policy conducted by the ECB in the early years of the 21st century 
was counterproductive in the overheated economy in which Spain found itself. This 
situation further stimulated the housing bubble, which was one of the determinants of the 
Spanish crisis. However, in other countries one of the main problems was the assets of 
sub-prime mortgages, a situation that did not affect Spain. 
Another of the peculiarities of the Spanish financial system is the incorporation of the 
generic provisions in 2002. For this reason, the impairment losses depend on various 
factors, in addition to loan delinquency. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of loan delinquency in 2006 and 2012 and the disparity in 
the evolution of the same in EU countries, of which a great majority belong to the Euro 




Figure 1. NPLs of EU countries 
 
Source: compiled from data from the World Bank-2016 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background to loan 
delinquency, the selection of variables and the objectives of the research. Section 3 
describes the data and the econometric methodology used. Section 4 presents the results 
obtained and the analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Background 
Loan delinquency and its determinants is a subject that has been widely studied in the 
empirical literature. Very common in these studies are the relationships of variables 
related to economic growth, such as GDP or the unemployment rate, and asset quality. 
The study of NPLs increased in importance thanks to Demirgüç-Kunt (1989), Whalen 
(1991) and Barr and Siems (1994), for whom bank failures were associated with increases 

























































































































































One of the seminal works on Spain is that of Freixas, Hevia and Inurrieta (1994) in which 
the authors examine how economic cycles affect NPLs by increasing the volume of loans. 
They use the aggregate data of bank defaults offered by the Bank of Spain, and create an 
econometric model adapted from corporate bankruptcies. They conclude that economic 
growth, inflation, expectations of economic activity, debt levels, monetary policy, wage 
growth and real interest rates are macroeconomic variables that explain loan delinquency. 
Salas and Saurina (2002) use the Arellano-Bond model with panel data to compare the 
determinants of the delinquency levels of Spanish banks and savings banks in the period 
1985-1997. Using macroeconomic variables and internal variables, they find that the 
variables that explain credit risk are the GDP growth rate, debt levels, credit growth, 
inefficiency, portfolio composition, size, net interest margin, capital ratio and market 
power. 
Other authors who have studied the determinants of NPLs in Spain are Fernández de Lis 
et al. (2000), Delgado and Saurina (2004), González and Díez (2010), Jiménez, López 
and Saurina (2013), Climent (2013) and Climent and Pavía (2015a). 
With regard to NPL research focused on other European countries, Podpiera and Weill 
(2008) study the causality between NPLs and profitability in order to examine whether 
any of these factors is an important determinant of bank failures. They use Arellano and 
Bond's General Moment Model in a panel of Czech banks between 1994 and 2005. Their 
results support the hypothesis of bad management, whereby a deterioration in profitability 
precedes the increase in NPLs. Foos, Norden and Weber (2010) investigate whether loan 
growth affected the riskiness of individual banks in Canada, Japan, and 13 European 
countries between 1997 and 2007.  They test three hypotheses on the relationship between 
abnormal loan growth and asset risk, bank profitability, and bank solvency. Their results 
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show that loan growth leads to an increase in loan loss provisions during the subsequent 
three years, a decrease in interest income and a decline in capital ratios. Festić et al. (2011) 
use the fixed effects and random effects method with panel data to examine rapid credit 
growth in Central and Eastern Europe. Their conclusions support the hypothesis that 
credit growth and the amount of financing available can damage the profitability of credit 
institutions by the increase in NPLs, probably due to the overheating of the economies of 
the five new member states from Central and Eastern Europe.  
Turning to Italy, the paper of Magri and Pico (2011) evaluates mortgages in Italian banks 
between 2000 and 2007 by an OLS regression. They conclude that a 1% increase in the 
probability of default is associated with an increase of 21 basis points in mortgage interest 
rates.  
In the Greek banking sector, Louzis, Vouldis and Metaxas (2012) look at NPLs using the 
dynamic panel data method and show that, for all loan categories, Greek NPLs can be 
explained mainly by macroeconomic variables (GDP, unemployment, interest rates, 
public debt) and management quality. Differences in the quantitative impact of 
macroeconomic factors among loan categories are evident, with non-performing 
mortgages being the least responsive to changes in macroeconomic conditions. Vouldis 
and Louzis (2017) conduct a new study on Greek banks with regard to NPLs. 
At the international level, Berger and DeYoung (1997) employ Granger causality 
techniques to test whether profitability in banks pre-dates loan quality, whether loan 
quality pre-dates profitability, or both. To this end, they use data from cross-sectional 
series of data on non-performing loans, profitability, capital ratios and other variables for 
commercial banks in the United States between 1985 and 1994. More recently, Brent et 
10 
 
al. (2011) use panel data with a fixed effects model to examine data on mortgage late 
payment rates in the USA for 2004 to 2009.  
Another study on the US market, that of Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011), uses loan 
level panel data to analyse the quality of subprime mortgage loans, examining the 
characteristics of the loan and macroeconomic conditions. They find that the quality of 
loans deteriorated for six consecutive years before the crisis, providing evidence that the 
rise and fall of the subprime mortgage market follows a classic lending boom-bust 
scenario in which unsustainable growth leads to the collapse of the market. They also say 
that problems were masked by high housing price appreciation between 2003 and 2005. 
Other works on NPLs for countries around the world include Ghosh (2005) on Indian 
banks, Asmild and Matthews (2012) on China and Dell'Ariccia, Igan and Leaven (2012), 
Crook and Banasik (2012), Ramcharan and Crowe (2013) and Sarmiento (2012) on the 
USA. 
3. Data and econometric methodology 
3.1. Variables description and dataset 
As seen in the literature review, the diversity of variables used to determine NPLs is wide, 
comprising macroeconomic and microeconomic variables, internal variables, assets, 
equity and balance sheet management.  
However, as stated above, the main objective of this study is not to determine the factors 
which cause loan delinquency but to research how the main problems suffered by the 
Spanish economy have affected NPLs, and especially to discover if this behaviour is the 
same in times of crisis as in growth periods. To do this, the most important factors that 
have influenced the Spanish economy and their impact on loan delinquency will be 
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assessed for the period 2004 to 2015. There was a period of great economic growth 
between 2004 and 2009 and a crisis period from 2010 to 2015. 
The study focuses on seven explanatory variables. There are four external variables of 
which three are macroeconomic: unemployment, HICP and interest rates, and one 
microeconomic: the price of housing. The three internal variables are: leverage, solvency 
and NPL coverage.  
The choice of these variables is motivated by the great problems that have affected the 
Spanish economy. The high rate of unemployment, the housing bubble, the excessive 
credit growth of commercial and savings banks, and the lack of self-financing have 
necessitated an injection of public funds into major Spanish banks. 
The database used for the calculation of NPLs, own funds, NPL coverage and leverage 
has been constructed from the annual accounts and reports of the credit institutions that 
make up the sample. The credit institutions in the database account for 99% of all banks, 
credit unions and Spanish savings banks. 
The expected results and the construction of the variables used in this research by the 
authors in the review of the literature now follow. 
The dependent variable is NPLs, created by the ratio of NPLs of customers compared to 
the total loans to customers. 
The model includes seven explanatory variables. The first is the unemployment rate, 
calculated as the rate of annual change in the unemployment rate. The data is obtained 
from the EPA1 published by the INE2. The unemployment rate as a determinant of NPLs 
                                                            
1 Labour Force Survey 
2 The National Statistics Institute 
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is studied by Brent et al. (2011), Magri and Pico (2011), Demyanyk and Van Hemert 
(2011), Crook and Banasik (2012), Sarmiento (2012), Louzis, Vouldis and Metaxas 
(2012), Ramcharan and Crowe (2013) and Vouldis and Louzis (2017). All these authors 
agree that there is a positive correlation between the unemployment rate and NPLs, 
although in the work of the last two authors the variable is not statistically significant. 
Moreover, in the study by Dell'Ariccia, Igan and Leaven (2012) the sign and statistical 
significance vary depending on the various models with different types of borrowers and 
different kinds of loans. 
The next explanatory variable is the interest rate, the 12-month Euribor published by the 
Bank of Spain. According to Freixas, Hevia and Inurrieta (1994), Delgado and Saurina 
(2004), Podpiera and Weill (2008), Jiménez, López and Saurina (2013) and Ramcharan 
and Crowe (2013), an increase in the interest rate contributes to an increase in NPLs. 
However, for Crook and Banasik (2012), the effect depends on how the variable is 
included in the model—NPLs will increase if the variable is taken from that year, but if 
the interest rate is taken with a delay of one year, the effect is the opposite, with decreasing 
NPLs. Finally, Dell'Ariccia, Igan and Leaven (2012) conclude that reductions in interest 
rates increase NPLs as a result of relaxing the conditions for granting mortgages, leading 
to growth in credit and more loan defaults. 
In order to capture the effect of inflation, the third explanatory variable is the Harmonised 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). Inflation can affect NPLs in two different ways. 
Firstly, higher inflation reduces borrowers' real incomes, causing higher NPLs (Us 2017), 
and secondly, higher inflation nominally appreciates property and reduces the real value 
of the loans, so it is expected to reduce NPLs. 
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Housing prices, determined as the price per square metre of private housing published by 
the Ministry of Development in hundreds of euros, is the next variable. There are 
contradictory results in terms of how the price of real property affects NPLs. Whereas in 
the studies of Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011), Brent et al. (2011), Crook and Banasik 
(2012), Dell'Ariccia, Igan and Leaven (2012) and Sarmiento (2012), the increases in the 
price of housing contribute to lower NPLs, in the works of Esteban and Estrada (2013) 
and Ramcharan and Crowe (2013) increased housing prices raise NPLs. 
Another explanatory variable is that of leverage, calculated as the ratio of loans to 
customers divided by customer deposits. Leverage is a determinant of NPLs in the studies 
of Fernández de Lis et al. (2000), Salas and Saurina (2002), Ghosh (2005), Foos, Norden 
and Weber (2010) and Louzis, Vouldis and Metaxas (2012). All these authors confirm 
that increased leverage increases NPLs. 
The sixth explanatory variable is solvency, the ratio of equity compared to assets. The 
increase in own funds as a ratio of the assets or risk-weighted assets is a determining 
factor contributing to the decline in NPLs in Berger and DeYoung (1997), Fernández de 
Lis et al. (2000), Salas and Saurina (2002), Ghosh (2005), Foos, Norden and Weber 
(2010) and Vallascas and Keasey (2012). All authors agree that this variable is also 
statistically significant in all these studies. 
Finally, no studies have been found that include the impairment loss ratio in terms of 
NPLs. Thus, in this case, it is another novelty that is included in the present work. 







Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
  NPLs Unemployment 
Price of 





Mean 0.044 0.091 18.055 1.116 0.062 -0.870 1.654 0.025 
Median 0.025 -0.026 18.430 1.044 0.059 -0.032 0.999 0.023 
Maximum 0.373 0.588 20.710 2.977 0.167 2.000 7.608 0.048 
Minimum 0.001 -0.165 14.590 0.575 -0.059 -11.500 0.145 0.002 
Std. Dev. 0.053 0.233 2.069 0.310 0.025 3.016 1.348 0.014 
3.2. Econometric methodology 
Due to the relatively short time series and the similarities between the analysed credit 
institutions, panel data techniques are used to analyse and quantify the impact of the 
macroeconomic and financial variables. This allows us to capture the specific effects and 
the unobservable differences between credit institutions. Using a panel data approach, 
one can control for the biases generated by potential heterogeneity and omit problems 
with the variables that are persistent over time.  
First, correlations between the explanatory variable and the dependent variables are 
analysed to see the relationships between them. The correlations between the explanatory 
variables are also studied to see possible cases of multicollinearity. Table 2 shows the 
correlations between all variables. 
Table 2. Correlations between the variables 
  NPLs Unemployment 
Price of 





NPLs 1        
Unemploy
ment 0.160*** 1       
Price of 
property  -0.417*** 0.384*** 1      
Leverage -0.153*** 0.026 0.220*** 1     
Solvency -0.255*** -0.101** -0.099** -0.178*** 1    
Inflation  -0.130*** -0.101** -0.060 -0.040 0.047 1   
NPL 
coverage -0.572*** -0.529*** 0.121*** 0.033 0.182*** 0.204*** 1  
Interest 
rates  -0.551*** 0.041 0.806*** 0.187*** -0.034 0.250*** 0.338*** 1 
Significance level ***, **, * 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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The problems of multicollinearity are discarded and it is verified that the explanatory 
variables can be good predictors of loan delinquency. The unit root test has detected 
seasonality in the unemployment variable, so this variable will be taken in differences. In 
the other explanatory variables, there are no seasonality problems. 
As for the econometric analysis, in a first regression a strong inertia of the dependent 
variable is detected. As a result, the dynamic panel model used is a two-step Generalized 
Method of Momentum (GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and 
Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), Bond and Windmeijer (2005) and Cucinelli 
(2016). The technique is especially suitable for small samples of T and large N, such as 
in this work.  
The GMM model facilitates the obtention of consistent and unbiased estimates of the 
relationship between the banks’ specific variables and the behaviour of non-performing 
loans. This methodology helps to alleviate some of the problems of endogeneity if the 
instruments are not correlated with the variables investigated (Espinoza and Prasad 2010, 
Said et al. 2013, Kohler et al. 2015). To test for the absence of correlation between the 
instruments and the error term, the Sargan test is performed. 
To verify the linearity or not of the model, two models will be estimated, one with the 
dependent variable in levels and another one taken with logarithms. To detect the 
structural change, three regression models will be considered—one with all the years from 
2004-2015 and two from each of the two sub-samples, 2004-2009 and 2010-2015, and a 
coefficient difference test will be performed between the two sub-samples. 
All regression models have been estimated using robust standard errors using the White 
method. There is no multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. The Influence 
Factor of Variance in all variables is less than 10. 
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The models are as follows: 
NPLs 𝛽 NPLs  𝛽 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝛽  𝐻𝐼𝑃𝐶  𝛽  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝛽 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝛽 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝛽 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  𝛽 𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝜔  
𝑙𝑜𝑔 NPLs 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 NPLs  𝛽 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝛽  𝐻𝐼𝑃𝐶  𝛽  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝛽 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝛽 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝛽 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  𝛽 𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝜔  
4. Results and discussion 
Table 3 shows the six econometric models. The dependent variable is the non-performing 
loans. Three regressions are made with a linear adjustment and three with a logarithmic 
adjustment. The same table shows the elasticity and the coefficient difference test. 
According to the results obtained, the NPLs of Spanish credit institutions in the period 
studied are better adjusted to a non-linear function, in particular logarithmically. When 
analyzing the results, it is found that the explanatory variables have a strong influence on 
the evolution of NPLs. Therefore, in this section we will comment on the results with 
respect to the first objective of the present work. 
First of all, significant inertia of the dependent variable is detected with a coefficient and 
elasticity of 0.538. With respect to the explanatory variables, unemployment acts as 
expected: an increase in the unemployment rate increases NPLs—in this case the 
elasticity is 0.073. One of the main factors that has influenced NPLs is the evolution of 
housing prices. An increase in the price of housing significantly reduces NPLs, since the 
elasticity of this variable is -3.262. The increase in leverage, in contrast to the results seen 
in the review of the literature, reduces NPLs, although the impact is reduced with an 
elasticity of -0.104. 
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Table 3. Regression models 
Dependent variable: Non-performing loans 
  In levels: Linear model In logarithms: Nonlinear model 
  2004-2015 2004-2009 2010-2015 Difference 2004-2015 Elasticity 2004-2009 2010-2015 Difference 
NPLs (-1) 
0.666*** 0.577 0.481*** 0.096 0.538*** 0.538 0.011 0.075** -0.062*** 
(0.006) (0.616) (0.018)   (0.011)   (0.012) (0.023)   
Unemployment 
0.061*** 0.046*** 0.084*** -0.037*** 0.809*** 0.073 1.727*** 0.586*** 1.144*** 
(0.001) (0.010) (0.004)   (0.030)   (0.242) (0.027)   
Price of 
property  
-0.015*** -0.009*** -0.024*** 0.015*** -0.181*** -3.262 -0.177*** -0.300*** 0.122*** 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001)   (0.004)   (0.024) (0.007)   
Leverage 
0.014*** -0.017 0.015*** -0.032 -0.093*** -0.104 -0.192 0.329*** -0.521*** 
-0.001 (0.020) (0.003)   (0.011)   (0.207) (0.033)   
Solvency 
-0.753*** -1.153*** -0.448*** -0.705*** -7.348*** -0.457 -10.032** -5.843*** -4.188 
(0.030) (0.291) 0.009)   (0.350)   (5.021) (0.555)   
Inflation  
-0.001*** -0.002* -0.002*** 0.001 -0.145*** 0.013 -0.082*** -0.018*** -0.064*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.014) (0.001)   
NPL coverage 
-0.002*** -0.001 -0.056*** 0.054*** -0.405*** -0.671 -0.354*** -0.842*** 0.488*** 
(0.000) (0.002 (0.003)   (0.012)   (0.040) (0.021)   
Interest rates  
1.231*** 0.821 2.018*** -1.198** 24.898*** 0.627 13.432* 12.009*** 1.422 
(0.045) (0.521) (0.076)   (0.788)   (04.774) (0.509)   
J statistic 53.067 18.474 33.690   39.855   6.437 30.41   
Prob (J-
statistic) 0.081 0.018 0.293   0.432   0.490 0.394   
Instruments 
rank 48 16 38   47   15 37   
N 381 271 139   381   271 139   
Significance level *, **, *** 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets 
 
Regarding equity, the higher the solvency level of the banks, the lower the default rate, 
with a very important effect, since the elasticity of this variable is -0.457.  Inflation 
influences NPLs according to the second theory presented in the description of the 
variables, since its increase reduces NPLs—in this case the impact is also moderate with 
an elasticity of 0.013. An important result is the influence of NPL coverage for loan 
delinquency (percentage of impairment losses provided as provisions). In this case it is 
verified that the greater the coverage, the lower the NPLs. In addition, the influence is 
important since the elasticity is -0.671. Finally, interest rates also have an important 
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impact on loan delinquency. As interest rates rise, non-performing loans rise significantly, 
with an elasticity of 0.627. 
4.1. Structural analysis 
In this section we examine the second objective of the work, in particular, if the effect of 
these factors seen in the previous section is different in growth periods compared to 
recession periods. According to the results obtained, it can be affirmed that the impact of 
the same explanatory variable in NPLs is different according to the economic cycle. In 
the coefficient difference test, five of the seven explanatory variables have been 
statistically significant when evaluating the difference between the coefficients of the two 
sub-samples, which cover the growth stage and the recession stage. These variables are: 
unemployment, housing prices, leverage, inflation and NPL coverage. In addition, the 
difference in inertia of the dependent variable between the two sub-periods is also 
statistically significant. 
Regarding the differences between these variables, it is verified that the impact of 
unemployment and inflation is higher in the stages of growth than in the recession stages, 
while for housing prices, leverage and coverage of the NPLs, the impact is greater in 
times of growth. As for inertia, this is greater in the periods of recession. 
4.2. Discussion of the results obtained 
In the six models it is shown that some inertia in the NPLs does exist. However, the most 
important research result obtained is that the magnitude of the impact of the variables on 
NPLs is not of the same intensity in periods of growth as it is in periods of recession. 
The results obtained, along with the economic situation, explain in part the rescue of 
Spanish credit institutions, which led to an injection of public funds of more than 60 
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billion euros. At the same time, these results can be used to allow policy-makers to 
prevent or mitigate crises. This is because although variables such as unemployment are 
difficult to control, others such as the evolution of housing prices, the increase in credit 
(leverage), the types of interest or the regulation of the own funds of credit institutions 
can be regulated by the political authorities. 
The impact of the housing bubble, encouraged by the expansionary monetary policy 
conducted by the Bank of Spain in an overheated economy such as the Spanish one, was 
one of the main causes of the increase in loan defaults and, consequently, of the bailout 
provided to Spanish credit institutions. The decrease in housing prices since 2008, 
together with the result obtained in the model with a -3.262 elasticity, contributed 
significantly to the increase in NPLs. This is one of the main causes of the crisis of the 
Spanish credit institutions. Policy-makers could have mitigated this circumstance by 
taking measures that would have slowed the housing bubble, which they clearly knew 
was developing. 
A similar situation occurred in the own funds of banks, since supervision was not as 
diligent as it should have been. Examples of this were the interventions that occurred and 
the reformulation of the financial statements with the appearance of a large number of 
bad loans, especially in Spanish savings banks. In this case, policy-makers should have 
regulated much earlier to avoid some of the crisis, since they were aware of the dangerous 
financial situation.  Thus, the supervising authority (the Bank of Spain) should have 
initiated policies to strengthen and control own funds much earlier than it did. This is 
demonstrated by the new rules that have emerged since Basel III. 
Another important result is the one obtained in the variable that measures the NPL 
coverage. In this case, an a priori explanation of this result cannot be given, so it would 
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be an interesting topic for further investigation. One of the possible explanations for this 
result is that the profits are being managed, so that when the percentage of coverage is 
high, the NPLs grow less than when the percentage is low. Another possible cause could 
be the impact of the generic provisions implemented in Spain and which depend on other 
factors such as credit growth and the coverage of same, in addition to NPLs. This variable 
is one of the most important in the stress tests carried out periodically by the European 
Banking Authority.  
Finally, the results obtained indicate that the effects of the variables that determine NPLs 
are different in times of recession compared to periods of growth. This observation is 
important because when policy-makers make their forecasts, this characteristic is not 
taken into account. For example, in the stress tests, when two or more scenarios are 
projected, the impact of the variables is the same—what they change are the 
macroeconomic or microeconomic data or the estimates of the assets and liabilities of 
credit institutions. Hence, this characteristic must be considered and different parameters 
for different scenarios must be estimated, thereby lessening the errors in the results of the 
stress test. Note that sometimes the forecast is very different from reality, such as the 
stress test of the European Banking Authority (EBA) confirming the good solvency of 
Bankia, which was published on 20 July 2011, the same day the Initial Public Offering 
ended (Climent and Pavia 2015b). 
5. Conclusions 
The Spanish financial system has undergone a profound change, with the financial map 
of 2013 being substantially different from that of 2010. In just two years, the savings 
banks, which had 50% of the market share, disappeared or underwent a profound 
transformation. All has been motivated in large part by the large allocations to cover NPLs 
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that reached record highs with figures above 13%. However, in the period 2004 to 2007, 
the rate of NPLs was extremely low and stable, less than 1% throughout the period. 
This great difference between the two periods is very important for the study of the main 
determinants of NPLs, especially to see if the effect on them is the same in periods of 
economic growth and crisis. It is for this reason that this study has researched the effect 
on NPLs of the main factors of the Spanish crisis, studying the differential effect in two 
stages—recession and growth. 
To this end, an econometric model has been estimated with panel data composed of most 
of the Spanish credit institutions, representing more than 99% of the assets of banks, 
credit unions and savings banks. We have studied the behaviour of the determinants of 
NPLs and especially if this behaviour is statistically different in times of economic growth 
compared with times of recession, with the aim of giving the financial system a new tool 
to predict the effects of leverage (credit growth), unemployment, solvency, the evolution 
of own funds and the movement of housing prices according to the cycle of the economy, 
i.e. growth or recession. 
One of main results obtained is that the behaviour of the determinants is different in 
recession periods than in times of growth.  
The price of housing is a very important factor affecting NPLs. In addition, the increase 
in unemployment and in interest rates increases NPLs, while the increase in housing 
prices, leverage, solvency, inflation and NPL coverage decreases them. 
In summary, it is clear that the impact on NPLs by the internal and external variables 
studied is very important in explaining NPLs.  
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In conclusion, it can be said that the results obtained can be helpful in applying 
preventative measures against loan delinquency by the policy markets. In addition, the 
results can be used to improve the methodology used in the stress tests to which the credit 
institutions are periodically subject. In this case, to differentiate the different stages of the 
economy, it is necessary to apply different intensities with regard to the impacts of the 
variables affecting NPLs, because the effect on NPLs of these variables is different in 
times of recession, not only from the change in the variable data, which is logical, but 
also from the intensity at which NPLs are affected in different economic situations. 
Therefore, the parameters used in the various stages of the stress test must be different. 
References 
Arellano, M. & Bover, O. (1995) Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of 
error-components models, Journal of Econometrics 68(1):29-51. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(94)01642-D 
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991) Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations. The review of economic 
studies 58(2):277-297. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297968 
Asmild, M. & Matthews, K. (2012) Multi-directional efficiency analysis of efficiency 
patterns in Chinese banks 1997–2008. European Journal of Operational Research 
219 (2):434–441. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.01.001 
Banco de España (2017a) Boletín estadístico. Entidades de crédito. Cuadros 
complementarios. http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/bolest4.html  




Barr, R. S., & Siems, T. F. (1994) Predicting bank failure using DEA to quantify 
management quality 94-1. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. 
Beck, R. Jakubik, P. & Piloiu, A. (2013) Non-performing loans: What matters in addition 
to the economic cycle? European Central Bank. Working Paper Series nº 1515 / 
February 2013 
Berger, A. N. & DeYoung, R. (1997) Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial 
banks. Journal of Banking & Finance 21(6):849-870. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(97)00003-4 
Blundell, R. & S. Bond (1998) Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic 
panel data models. Journal of Econometrics 87(1):115-143. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(98)00009-8  
Bond, S. & F. Windmeijer (2005) Reliable inference for GMM estimators? Finite sample 
properties of alternative test procedures in linear panel data models. Econometric 
Reviews 24(1):1-37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1081/ETC-200049126 
Brent, W. Kelly, L. Lindsey-Taliefero and D. Price, R. (2011) Determinants of Mortgage 
Delinquency. Journal of Business and Economics Research 9 (2):27-47.  doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jber.v9i2.1815 
Climent Serrano, S. (2012) La caída de las cajas de ahorros españolas. Cuestión de 
rentabilidad, tamaño y estructura de propiedad. Estudios de Economía Aplicada 
30 (2):1-26. 
Climent-Serrano, S & Pavía JM (2014) Determinantes y diferencias en la rentabilidad de 
Cajas y Bancos. Revista de economía aplicada 22(65):117-154. 
24 
 
Climent-Serrano, S & Pavía JM (2015a) Determinants of profitability in Spanish financial 
institutions. A comparative study of the entities that needed public funds and those 
that did not. Journal of Business Economics and Management 16(6):1170-1184. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/16111699.2013.801881. 
Climent-Serrano, S & Pavía JM. (2015b) BANKIA: ¿Para qué sirven los estados 
contables y los órganos de control? Estudios de Economía Aplicada 33(1):1-42. 
Climent-Serrano, S. (2013) La reestructuración del sistema bancario español tras la crisis 
y la solvencia de las entidades financieras. Consecuencias para las cajas de 
ahorros. Revista de Contabilidad Spanish Accounting Review 16 (2):136-146. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.rcsar.2013.07.003 
Crook, J. & Banasik, J. (2012) Forecasting and explaining aggregate consumer credit 
delinquency behavior. International Journal of Forecasting 28:145-160. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2010.12.002 
Cucinelli, D. (2016) Can speed kill? The cyclical effect of rapid credit growth: evidence 
from bank lending behavior in Italy. The Journal of Risk Finance 17(5). doi: 
10.1108/JRF-03-2016-0035 
Delgado, J. & Saurina, J. (2004) Riesgo de crédito y dotaciones a insolvencias. Un análisis 
con variables macroeconómicas. Moneda y Crédito 219:11-42. 
Dell´Ariccia, G., Igan, D. & Leaven, L. (2012) Credit booms and lending standards: 
evidence from the subprime mortgage market. Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 44 (2-3):367-384. doi: 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00491.x 
25 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. (1989) Deposit-institution failures: a review of empirical literature. 
Economic Review - Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; Cleveland 25(4):2-19. 
Demyanyk, Y. & Van Hemert, O. (2011) Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis. 
The Review of Financial Studies 24 (6):1847-1880.  doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp033 
Espinoza, R.A. & Prasad, A. (2010) Non-performing loans in the GCC banking system 
and their macroeconomic effects. IMF Working paper No 10/224. 
Esteban Carranza, J. & Estrada, D. (2013) Identifying the determinants of mortgage 
default in Colombia between 1997 and 2004. Annals of Finance 9:501-518. DOI: 
10.1007/s10436-012-0196-z 
European Commission (2012) Eurogroup statement on Spain 
http://ec.europa.eu/spain/pdf/eurogrupo-espahna-09.06.pdf 
Fernández de Lis, S. Martínez, J. & Saurina, J. (2000) Crédito bancario, morosidad y 
dotación de provisiones para insolvencias en España. Boletín Económico Banco 
de España, November:1-10 
Festić, M., Kavkler, A., & Repina, S. (2011) The macroeconomic sources of systemic 
risk in the banking sectors of five new EU member states. Journal of Banking & 
Finance 35(2):310-322. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.08.007 
Foos, D. Norden, L. and Weber, M. (2010) Loan growth and riskiness of Banks. Journal 




Freixas Dargallo, X., De Hevia Payá, J. & Inurrieta Beruete, A. (1994) Determinantes 
macroeconómicos de la morosidad bancaria: un modelo empírico para el caso 
español. Moneda y Crédito 199:125-156. 
Ghosh (2005). Does leverage influence banks' non-performing loans? Evidence from 
India. Applied Economics Letters 12(15):913-918. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504850500378064 
González Pascual, J. and Díez Cebamanos, N. (2010) El crédito y la morosidad en el 
sistema financiero español. Boletín Económico de ICE 2997:51- 65. 
Jimenez, G., Lopez, J.A. & Saurina, J. (2013) How does competition affect bank risk-
taking? Journal of Financial Stability 9:185-195. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2013.02.004 
Kohler, K., Guschanski, A. & Stockhammer, E. (2015) “How does financial affect 
functional income distribution? A theoretical clarification and empirical 
assessment”, Economic Discussion papers 2015-2005, Kingston University 
London, London. 
Louzis, D. P., Vouldis, A. T. & Metaxas, V. L. (2012) Macroeconomic and bank-specific 
determinants of non-performing loans in Greece: A comparative study of 
mortgage, business and consumer loan portfolios. Journal of Banking & Finance 
36(4):1012-1027. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.10.012 
Magri, S. & Pico, R. (2011) The rise of risk-based pricing of mortgage interest rates in 




Ontiveros, E., & Berges, A. (2010) Cajas y bancos: la gestión de la crisis. Economía 
Exterior 54:27-38. 
Podpiera, J. & Weill, L. (2008) Bad luck or bad management? Emerging banking market 
experience. Journal of Financial Stability 4:135–148. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2008.01.005 
Ramcharan, R. & Crowe, C. (2013) The impact of house prices on consumer credit: 
evidence from an internet bank. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
45(6):1085-1115. doi: 10.1111/jmcb.12045 
Said, R., Daud, M.M., Radjeman, L.A. & Ismail, N. (2013) Probing corporate ethical 
identity of Shari’ah compliant companies. Procedia Economics and Finance 
7:230-235. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(13)00239-6. 
Salas, V. & Saurina, J. (2002) Credit Risk in Two Institutional Regimes: Spanish 
Commercial and Savings Banks. Journal of Financial Services Research 
22(3):203-224. doi: 10.1023/A:1019781109676 
Sarmiento, C. (2012) The role of the economic environment on mortgage defaults during 
the Great Recession. Applied Financial Economics 22(3):243-250. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09603107.2011.613753 
Us, V. (2017) A dynamic approach to analysing the effect of the global crisis on 
nonperforming loans: evidence from the Turkish banking sector. Applied 
Economics Letters 24(3):186-192. doi: 10.1080/13504851.2016.1176106 
28 
 
Vallascas, F. & Keasey, K. (2012) Bank resilience to systemic shocks and the stability of 
banking systems: Small is beautiful. Journal of International Money and Finance 
31(6):1745-1776. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2012.03.011 
Vouldis, A. T. & Louzis, D. P. (2017) Leading indicators of non-performing loans in 
Greece: the information content of macro-, micro-and bank-specific variables. 
Empirical Economics 1-28. doi:10.1007/s00181-017-1247-0 
Whalen, G. (1991) A proportional hazards model of bank failure: an examination of its 
usefulness as an early warning tool. Economic Review - Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland 27(1):21-30. 
